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Abstract—As the industrial cyber-infrastructure become in-
creasingly important to realise the objectives of Industry 4.0,
the consequence of disruption due to internal or external
faults become increasingly severe. Thus there is a need for a
resilient infrastructure. In this paper, we propose a contract-
based methodology where components across layers of the cyber-
infrastructure are associated with contracts and a light-weight
resilience manager. This allows the system to detect faults
(contract violation monitored using observers) and react (change
contracts dynamically) effectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industry 4.0 has the potential to radically improve the
productivity of manufacturing systems. The next generation
of smart factories can perform more efficiently, collectively
and resiliently [1], [2], [3]. A resilient system has the ability
to maintain and improve services even when challenged by
failures and evolutionary changes. It indicates a system to
be more flexible, more dynamic and less prescriptive than a
traditional fault tolerant system [4].
Resiliency can be obtained using software or hardware
based fault tolerance mechanisms. The latter solution demands
physical redundancy such as replication of computational and
communicational resources. For software based solutions, we
find techniques such as replication of programs, checkpoints
that act as restoration points and monitoring services that
rely on timestamps [5] and fault trees, to detect faults. More
recently, we see software adaptation techniques that switch
between off-line generated code based on ontology [6] or
application graphs [7], or dynamically create/modify code at
runtime [2], [8].
Our cyber-infrastructure architecture follows the classical
layered middle-ware with three different layers [3], see Fig. 1.
The physical layer comprises physical components such as
sensors, actuators, controllers and communication hardware.
The platform layer embodies computational and communi-
cational platforms such as operating systems and network
managers. Finally, the application layer accommodates the
software components which describe the behaviour of an
application.
In [5] and [9], authors discuss an outline for a holistic
approach for developing a resilient cyber-infrastructure that
manages applications, devices, resources, deployment, security
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and time etc. However, [9] does not present any architecture
details. In contrast, RIAPS [5] describes an architecture for
developing a distributed resilient CPS. As an example, a
resilient discovery service (DS) was explored; a failure of a
publisher/subscriber pair is detected using heartbeat signals
and timestamps. When a failure occurs, DS de-registers the
pair from the list of registered services. A publisher/subscriber
needs to re-register once they become active. The process of
de-registering and re-registering is very time consuming and
it also needs to be communicated with neighbouring nodes. In
this scenario, the cause of the failure (e.g. intermittent fault
in the physical layer) and the expected recovery time (e.g.
2 seconds or 2 hours) were not available to the DS manager
residing in the platform layer. If the recovery time information
was available to the DS manager, it can choose not to de-
register a publisher/subscriber and avoid the unnecessary time
consuming registration process across all neighbouring nodes.
Thus, there is a need for communication across layers to
improve resiliency.
A. Problem statement
Existing resiliency techniques are inefficient due to two key
limitations: (1) They do not consider cross-layer interactions of
a cyber infrastructure [2], [6], [5], [7], [8]. (2) The techniques
depend on a centralised decision-making component which
collects information from other distributed components to
detect faults [6], [7], except some which are tightly coupled to
an industry standard [2], [8]. Both limitations (lack of cross-
layer communication and centralised decision making) are
not acceptable for Industry 4.0 where the cyber-infrastructure
is heavily distributed and encourages attributes such as self-
awareness where even the edge nodes of the network are
expected to make decisions [1], [2]. This is unlike most
existing pyramid-like infrastructure with predefined hierarchy
of connections from sensors/actuators at the lowest levels and
decision making software at the highest levels. Hence, there is
a need for a new resilient methodology that allows for a more
fine-grain distributed resilience management with cross-layer
interactions and is aligned with the attributes of Industry 4.0.
B. Proposed solution
In this paper, we propose contract-based methodology
where components across layers of the cyber-infrastructure
are associated with contracts and a light-weight resilience
manager, see Fig. 1. This allows the system to detect faults
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Fig. 1. Proposed contract-based methodology for resiliency. Its shows a
distributed resiliency management (RM) at component-level and across layers.
(contract violation detected using Timed or Hybrid Automata)
and react (change contracts dynamically) effectively. When a
component-level resilience manager is unable to provide any
feasible solution to a fault, a layer-level resilience manager is
informed. It has global-level understanding of the system and
may find a feasible solution. We now discuss how the prosed
methodology aligns with the attributes of Industry 4.0.
Self-reconfigurability: This refers to the ability for the
individual node (or a component) to detect disturbances and
apply corrective and pre-emptive measures. This attribute
aligns with the core contribution of the proposed methodology.
We use contracts to clearly define the functionality of a
component. Any disturbances that violate the contracts are
monitored using observers that run concurrently. As a recovery
strategy a component switches between contracts (changing
it’s behaviour) to contain faults, a step towards ensuring zero
downtime production.
Self-optimisation: The availability of the resources in a
cyber-infrastructure changes dynamically, detected using a dis-
covery service [5]. The nodes are expected to self-optimise to
improve performance. In order to maximise the performance,
component manager tries to select the behaviour that locally
maximises the use of available resources to yield the maximum
Quality of Service (QoS). This may lead to a non-optimal
solution, a limitation of our current work.
Peer-awareness: This refers to the ability to communicate
with peers to collaboratively diagnose and respond to faults. In
the proposed methodology, components communicate via fault
communication channels to effectively deal with faults. For
example when a producer that is publishing sensor data needs
to be restarted, the consumer is informed that the producer is
inactive and knows when it will be reactivated.
II. PROPOSED CONTRACT-BASED RESILIENCY
In this section, we describe a new methodology for de-
veloping distributed resilient architectures, called Contract-
based Resiliency. It is motivated by component-based en-
gineering which has been successfully used for large-scale
system designs and the use of contract-based designs for
explicitly pinpointing the responsibilities and assumptions of
a component [10]. In our approach, we describe an application
using a network of components and use contracts to capture
the behaviour of the components. Finally, we detect failures
(contract violation) and react (change contracts dynamically)
to the disturbances, providing resiliency.
Fig. 2. Overview of the component model with the resilience manager. With
respect to Fig. 1, software components of application layer, computational and
communication platforms of platform layer are considered as components.
A. Component architecture
A component is an open system that receives inputs from
the environment, executes a behaviour, and generates output
to the environment. The environment could be the collection
of other components or the physical world. An overview of a
component is presented in Fig. 2.
• Interface: It defines the Input/Output data channels of
a component. Data is consumed through input interface,
processed by the component, and output data is produced.
• Behaviours: A component can be described using multiple
behaviours. Each behaviour is associated with a QoS. At
runtime, the resilience manager selects the behaviour of the
component.
• Contracts: A contract specifies assumptions on the be-
haviour of the environment, and guarantees about the be-
haviour of the component [10]. At runtime, the resilience
manager can switch between contracts to react to the dis-
turbances in the system.
• Resilience manager: Detects faults (using Observers) and
decides (control logic) the best course of action (response
strategy). It also responds to the fault information from other
components.
B. Example application
Fig. 3 presents the running example, called Conveyor Belt
Block Pick-up (CBBP). The application relies on the timing
information from sensors S1 and S2 and then activate the robot
at the right time to pick-up block from a moving conveyor belt.
Application graph: The CBBP application is described as
a set of connected components in the form of a graph, called
application graph. The nodes of the graph are components
and the edges represent communication between components.
Fig. 3. Overview of the mapping between software components (c1, . . . , c4)
of the application layer and the computational components (n1, . . . , n5) of
the platform layer. Physical layer is not shown for brevity.
See the graph in Fig. 3 with components c1, c2, c3 and c4.
Component c1 samples sensor (S1) data periodically (Tsamp).
It applies different signal processing techniques (described
using different component Behaviours, see Fig. 2) to extract
the time (t1) when the centre of a block is aligned with sensor
S1. When the block is detected, the timing information (t1)
is sent to component c3. Similarly, component c2 periodically
samples sensor S2 to compute and send the timing information
(t2) to component c3. Based on the received timing informa-
tion, c3 computes the time (t3) when the robot needs to be
activated and then sends it to component c4. Finally, the robot
is activated to pick-up a block from the assembly line.
Mapping between application and platform layers:
The platform layer comprises a set of computational plat-
forms (n1, . . . , n5) and connecting communication platforms
(m1, . . . ,m5). The mapping of the components in an appli-
cation graph to computational platforms is shown in Fig. 3.
E.g., component c1 is mapped to computational platform n3.
Assuming that c1 has four possible behaviours (BEH ∈
{behc11 , behc12 , behc13 , behc14 }),
based on the mapping information we assume an execution
time cost function EC : BEH → R is given. Furthermore,
we assume the communication between components is handled
by a network infrastructure. We assume a communication time
cost function CC : BEH → R is given.
C. Generating contracts from timing deadlines (off-line)
Using the speed of the conveyor belt we can compute the
time taken for a block to travel from sensor (S1) to the actuator
(robot), denoted as ∆s1→a1 . We assume the decomposition of
end-to-end timing constraints (e.g., 10 sec from S1 to robot)
into deadlines for each component is given. For the CBBP
example, we assume the end-to-end latency is decomposed as
described by Eq. 1, where all terms are constants.
Ts1→c1 + Tc1→c3 + Tc3→c4 + Tc4→a1 ≤ ∆s1→a1 (1)
1) Contracts to satisfy the timing constraint Ts1→c1 :
Constant Ts1→c1 refers to the time taken for n3 to read sensor
s1 and send the data to component c1. Based on existing
notation [10], the first contract on n3, denoted by symbol C 1n3
is as follows.
C 1n3 :

inputs : s1 data ∈ R
outputs : c1 data ∈ R
assumptions : >
guarantees : c1 data = s1 data within Ts1→c1
Furthermore, we know that the sensors must be sampled
periodically every Tsamp. This requirement can be treated as a
separate contract on n3, C samplingn3 . In this case, both contacts
can be composed 1.
C 1
′
n3 :

inputs : s1 data ∈ R
outputs : c1 data ∈ R
assumptions : >
guarantees : c1 data = s1 data within Ts1→c1
every Tsamp
2) Contracts to satisfy the timing constraint Tc1→c3 :
Constant Tc1→c3 refers to the time taken for n3 to send the
output data of c1 to n4 over a network and n4 to send the data
to c3.
Component c1 has four behaviours with different execution
times on n3, as described earlier. For each of the behaviours,
we generate contracts. E.g., for behaviour behc11 the contract
C c1beh1n3 assumes nothing (represented using the symbol >)
and guarantees execution of behc11 within EC(behc11 ).
We do not assume the communication delay to be a constant.
At runtime, communication interface on n3 and the network
controller engage to create a contract C c1n4n3 that provides a
time bound on the delivery of c1’s data to n4.
Based on an expected time (Tn4→c3 ) for processing the
received data on n4 and sending it to c3, a single contract
C c1c3n4 is created where it assumes nothing and guarantees the
delivery within Tn4→c3 .
Finally, to monitor the timing constraint Tc1→c3 , observer
O1n4 executes on n4 to monitor the timestamps on the data
from c1 to c3. Component n4 was chosen since c3 is mapped
to n4. Note that if the observer was to execute on any other
platform component such as n5, then timing information from
n4 need to be sent to n5. This unnecessarily increases the fault
detection time of the architecture.
D. Runtime reconfiguration
1. Application-level reconfiguration: The state of the
application is described by an ordered set of contracts cur-
rently selected by the components to execute their behaviour.
For the running example, the ordered set of components
is [c1, c2, c3, c4]. The initial state of the application can
be [C c1beh1n3 ,C
c2beh1
n1 ,C
c3beh2
n4 ,C
c4beh1
n5 ]. Any application-level
reconfiguration is a transition from one application state to
another. This state transition occurs when a fault is detected
(violation of a contract) and a new contract is adopted by a
software component.
2. Platform-level reconfiguration: As described earlier, the
platform layer consists of computational and communicational
1Rules of composition is a part of the future work. They can be based on
existing work [10].
platforms. Once again, the state of the platform can be de-
scribed as an ordered set of contracts e.g., [C c1n3n3 ,C
c1c3
n4 , . . . ].
Any platform-level reconfiguration is a transition from one
platform state to another. E.g., due to high network traffic
the contract C c1n3n3 needed to be re-negotiated to C
c1n3′
n3 ,
representing a reconfiguration at platform level. Note, this may
or may not lead to an application level reconfiguration.
III. FAULT-DETECTION AND RESPONSE
In the proposed resilience architecture, fault detection is
tightly coupled with the contracts. A fault detection (viola-
tion of contracts monitored using observers) and response
(change in contract by the resilience manger) will be managed
efficiently. In the following, we discuss some of the faults
experienced in distributed systems [11].
A. Hanging processes
In this case, execution time of a process is longer than
normal. For our example, component c1 may take longer
than expected. The time constraints are captured using the
contract C 1
′
n3 in Sec. II-C1. It states that the process must be
completed within the duration of Ts1→c1 and the process must
be executed every Tsamp.
Fault detection technique: The contract C 1
′
n3 is associated
with an observer. The observer O1
′
n3 is implemented using
timed automaton [12], see Figure 4.
t˙ = 1
Idle
initial
t = 0
t˙ = 1
Process
t˙ = 1
Error1
t˙ = 1
Error2
start!
t=0
end!
t=0
t>Tsamp
t=0,err(1)!
t>Ts1→c1
t=0,err(2)!
reset!
reset!
Fig. 4. An observer implemented using timed automata. It detects if the
process deadline (Ts1→c1 ) or sampling rate (Tsamp) are not satisfied.
Response to the fault: The observer failure is detected
by the control logic of the resilience manager. As a response
strategy, the component c1 is restarted and the resilience
manager of component c3 is notified about the type of fault and
the expected recovery time via the fault channel, see Fig. 2.
Based on the recovery time of a producer (e.g., c1), the
control logic of the consumer (e.g., c3) may select different
response strategies. For example, c3 can reduce its execution
time by selecting a different behaviour. In this case, based on
the recovery time behc13 can be selected instead of beh
c2
1 . Of
course, this reduces the quality of service. This response is
achieved by switching the contracts at runtime from C c1beh1n3
to C c1beh2n3 , resulting in an application-level reconfiguration.
B. Network outages
In this case, communication link has failed. For our exam-
ple, consider the connection between n3 and n4.
Fault detection technique: Using heartbeat signals
component-level resilience managers of n3 and n4 periodically
detect the status of the connection.
Response to the fault: Observers fail when the heartbeat
signals are not received by the resilience managers of n3 and
n4. This triggers the control logic which can selects a response
strategy such as switching from a wired to a wireless connec-
tion. Furthermore, if the component-level resilience managers
were unable to re-establish the link, they would inform a layer-
level resilience manager such as an SDN controller to find an
alternative route.
IV. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
We have presented a contract-based methodology for en-
abling resilient cyber-infrastructure for Industry 4.0. Applica-
tions are described as a set of modular components that are
distributed over a network. Contracts are used for describing
the component’s interaction with other components (and or
across layers). Finally, the terms of the contract are monitored
using observers. We detect failures (contract violation) and
react (change contracts dynamically) to the disturbances, for
providing resiliency.
In future, we plan to develop a multi-dimensional resilience
metric to evaluate resilience with respect to different perfor-
mance indicators such as security, safety, throughput, recov-
ery time, etc. Furthermore, we plan to support parametrized
contracts to automatically respond to faults across different
components. E.g., if the robot is unable to meet the deadline
to successfully pick-up blocks from the moving conveyor as
a response the motor speed can be reduced (update contract
w.r.t. conveyor speed). This idea is along our vision to support
plug-n-produce which requires dynamic reconfiguration.
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